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This article compares the privilege against self-incrimination under
the Alaska Constitution with the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal privilege. After providing background
on both the privilege and the theory of divergent interpretations of
state constitutions, the article presents Alaska decisions that have
both expanded and refused to expand the minimum federal
constitutional standard when interpreting the Alaska Constitution's
self-incrimination provisions. The article concludes with an
assessment of the probable effects of Alaska courts' general
reluctance to provide broader protection under the Alaska
Constitution.
I. INTRODUCrION
Alaska courts, like the courts of other states, are free to
interpret their state constitution as affording citizens greater civil
and political rights than those provided by the Federal Constitu-
tion.' Since the 1970's, as the United States Supreme Court has
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1. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 n.12 (1984) ("[States]
remain free to adopt more rigorous safeguards governing the admissibility of
scientific evidence than those imposed by the Federal Constitution."); see also
Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985) (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S.
at 491 n.12); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970)
("[W]e are free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional
rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitution .... ."); Roberts v. State, 458
P.2d 340, 342-43 (Alaska 1969) ("[W]e are not limited by decisions of the United
States Supreme Court or the United States Constitution when we expound our
state constitution; the Alaska Constitution may have broader safeguards than the
minimum federal standards."). See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
generally become more restrictive in interpreting the Federal
Constitution, some state courts have granted greater protection
under their respective state constitutions.2 Alaska courts have been
at the forefront of this trend.3
As at least one commentator has noted, most state courts have
been unwilling to provide greater protection to criminal defendants
under their constitutions than the federal constitutional minimum.4
Alaska courts, however, have broadly interpreted various provisions
of the Alaska Constitution to confer greater rights to criminal
defendants than the Federal Constitution. As early as 1969, in
Roberts v. State,' the Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska
Constitution's right to counsel should be interpreted more broadly
than the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment right to coun-
DEFENSES 1.01 (2d ed. 1994).
2. See FRIESEN, supra note 1, 1.01, at 1-2 ("Since 1970, state supreme courts
have handed down hundreds of opinions that grant protection for civil rights and
liberties, based on provisions in their state constitutions, that is greater than or
equivalent to the protection given these rights under parallel provisions of the
United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court.").
3. From 1968 to 1989, Alaska courts were among the most active of the state
courts that relied on their state constitutions in expanding United States Supreme
Court rulings. Kermit L. Hall, Of Floors and Ceilings: The New Federalism and
State Bills of Rights, 44 FLA. L. REv. 637, 659-60 (1992) (reproducing tables from
Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court Revolution, 74
JUDICATURE 190, 193 (1991)).
4. Hall, supra note 3, at 655-58. Prior to the early 1970's, few state courts
found greater state constitutional rights for criminal defendants. Because federal
courts were so active in this area in the 1960's, most state courts saw little need to
look to state constitutions for increased protection. See FRIESEN, supra note 1, 1
1.01, at 1-4 to -5; Hall, supra note 3, at 638; William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 495
(1977). Recently, even states whose courts had been fairly active in finding
independent state constitutional grounds have been curtailed. In California and
Florida, voters have passed initiatives purporting to limit the power of state courts
to grant any greater protection to criminal defendants in search and seizure cases
than those afforded by the Federal Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 12; Hall, supra note 3, at 659-60. Professor Friesen reviews the
pros and cons of reliance on state constitutional law in FRIESEN, supra note 1,
1.03.
5. 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969). Roberts overruled Knudsen v. City of
Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1960), in which the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution was coextensive with the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Id. at 379.
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sel.6 Alaska courts have also been active in cases involving
unreasonable searches and seizures,' an area in which Alaska's
constitutional right of privacy is a factor as well.'
In contrast, Alaska courts have not generally interpreted the
self-incrimination provisions of the Alaska Constitution more
broadly than the federal standard.9 In the relatively few cases
where Alaska courts do construe the state provisions more broadly,
the efficiency and trustworthiness of the judicial fact-finding process
6. ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 11; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Roberts, 458 P.2d at
342-43.
7. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 791 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1990) (holding that search
of defendant's wallet for weapons incident to arrest violated state constitution
despite United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 278 (1973)); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979) (rejecting the United
States Supreme Court's limited conception of the privacy interest retained by an
arrestee in the context of a pre-incarceration inventory search); State v. Glass, 583
P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) (holding that federal decisions dealing with the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution should not be regarded as
determinative of the scope of Alaska's right to privacy amendment); Zehrung v.
State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977), modified on reh'g, 573 P.2d 858 (Alaska 1978)
(expanding the privacy interest of an arrestee in connection with searches incident
to arrest); Woods & Rhode, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977) (prohibiting
warrantless administrative inspections of business premises as a result of the
expansive protection afforded by the Alaska Constitution against warrantless
searches and seizures and invasions of privacy). The Alaska Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other
property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14.
8. The right of privacy, found in Article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion, provides in pertinent part that "[Ihe right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
9. Constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination are found in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides in pertinent part
that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Alaska Constitution's self-
incrimination provision uses similar language, that "[n]o person shall be compelled
in any criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself." ALASKA CONST. art.
I, § 9.
In this article, a broad definition of protection against self-incrimination will
be used. A number of constitutional provisions besides the Fifth Amendment and
Article I, section 9 can be applied to exclude incriminating statements of criminal
defendants from admission at trial. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
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are at issue." Although Alaska courts have shown concern for
the vindication of criminal defendants' self-incrimination rights,
they have not been willing to grant greater protection under the
Alaska Constitution unless the fair and efficient resolution of
factual disputes in court proceedings is implicated as well.
Part II will provide background on the privilege against self-
incrimination, and Part III will analyze the practical effects
resulting from different interpretations of state and federal
constitutional provisions. Part IV will give an overview of Alaska's
self-incrimination privilege. Part V concludes by contending that
the Alaska courts' resort to the federal constitutional standard of
self-incrimination will ultimately result in a greater recourse to
federal courts by Alaska criminal defendants.
II. SELF-INCRIMINATION PROTECrION UNDER THE FEDERAL
AND ALASKA CONSTITUTIONS
The right to remain silent is a critical part of both the federal
and Alaska criminal justice systems. Without protection against
self-incrimination, criminal trials would be transformed from the
current system, in which the government bears the burden to prove
every element of a charge beyond a reasonable doubt, to an
"inquisitorial" system, in which defendants would be forced to
testify in order to prove their innocence." A criminal defendant's
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself
is at the core of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as well as Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion.
Although the Fifth Amendment is often considered to be the
only provision of the Federal Constitution that protects the
privilege against self-incrimination, other provisions also apply.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
vehicle by which the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination
10. See infra notes 32-72 and accompanying text.
11. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). An analysis
of the development of the privilege against self-incrimination is found in Jeffrey
M. Feldman & Stuart A. Ollanik, Compelling Testimony in Alaska: The Coming
Rejection of Use and Derivative Use Immunity, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 229 (1986).
The authors trace the privilege from its origins in Talmudic law, through the
abuses of the English Star Chamber court, to its adoption in English common law
courts and the United States Constitution. Id. at 232-35.
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protection is applied to the states.12 Moreover, the Due Process
Clause ensures that the prosecution bears the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal cases. 3 This allocation
of the burden of proof also affects self-incrimination rights. If the
defense bore the burden of proof, defendants would often be
forced to testify to prove their innocence.
The Sixth Amendment also plays an important role in self-
incrimination cases. 4 Confessions taken in violation of a de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel are as vulnerable to
exclusion as those taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. 5  The Sixth Amendment right to
counsel does not attach until adversarial proceedings have begun.
Once proceedings have begun and counsel has been retained or
appointed, the same requirement as the Fifth Amendment rule
applies: an accused may not be questioned outside of the presence
of counsel unless he or she initiates the questioning. 6
12. The Fifth Amendment was first incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
14. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusations; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Alaska's version of the Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of twelve, except that the legislature
may provide for a jury of not more than twelve nor less that six in courts
not of record. The accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be released on bail, except for capital offenses
when the proof is evident and the presumption great; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
15. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159 (1985); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
16. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. But see McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment, unlike the Fifth Amendment, is offense
specific); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (noting that while police were
under no obligation to inform accused that an attorney hired by his family was at
the police station asking to see him, the result would have been different if
1995]
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There is a very peculiar and complex relationship between the
right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Although
there is not usually thought to be a Fifth Amendment right to
counsel, under Miranda v. Arizona, a person accused of a crime
has the right to an attorney during custodial interrogation."8 Once
an accused has asserted this right to counsel during custodial
interrogation, questioning "must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent."' 9  The Miranda rule further safeguards an accused's self-
incrimination rights by placing the burden on the authorities to
ensure that the accused does not involuntarily incriminate himself
or herself
Thus, when Alaska courts face a self-incrimination claim, they
may draw on federal courts' interpretations of a number of
provisions of the Federal Constitution. Theoretically, a criminal
defendant's statement could be excluded by a number of provisions
of the Alaska Constitution other than Article I, section 9.
However, as discussed in the cases below, Alaska courts have not
developed an extensive self-incrimination analysis distinct from the
federal standard. They have generally not found the privilege in
any provisions of the Alaska Constitution other than Article I,
section 9.
III. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS
Some commentators consider differences in interpretation of
relatively similar provisions of state and federal constitutions to be
entirely in line with notions of federalism. Under this theory,
the United States Constitution can be seen as a "floor" that
adversary proceedings had begun and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached).
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Id. at 444-45.
19. Id. at 4-74. The United States Supreme Court later established a "bright-
line" rule in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), that once an accused
invokes his or her right to counsel, the accused may not be subjected to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him or
her, unless the suspect unilaterally initiates further conversation. Id. at 484-85; see
also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (prohibiting re-interrogation
without the actual presence of counsel, as the Fifth Amendment provides more
than just an opportunity to consult with counsel).
20. See FRIESEN, supra note 1, I 1.03, at 1-13 to -16; Brennan, supra note 4,
at 502.
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provides the minimum constitutional protections that must be
adhered to by both the federal government and the states.2 A
state then has the option to set a "ceiling" of greater rights over
and above the federal minimum.' On the other hand, a state
may simply decide that its constitution does not provide any greater
protection than the Federal Constitution. If a state chooses the
latter course, its highest court will look to United States Supreme
Court decisions only for guidance in resolving claims under its own
constitution. 2
The practical danger of relying solely on federal constitutional
grounds is that it leaves little margin for error. It is often difficult
to determine the exact parameters of federal constitutional law
when the rights of criminal defendants are in question.24 Further-
more, by only applying the federal standard, a state court makes it
easier for a defendant to collaterally attack his or her conviction in
21. The states are currently obligated to follow nearly every provision of the
Federal Constitution pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brennan, supra note 4, at 493-95, provides a historical overview of
the gradual incorporation of the Federal Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.
22. Hall, supra note 3, at 638 ("In the architecture of the New Federalism, the
Supreme Court, interpreting the Bill of Rights, sets the minimum floor for rights,
while state supreme courts, interpreting their state bills of rights, fix the ceiling.").
23. Professor Friesen refers to reliance on federal constitutional law in
interpreting civil or political rights as the "conformity" or "lock-step" approach to
state constitutional interpretation. Other approaches are the "primacy" approach,
which looks to state constitutional law first, and the "supplement [or] indepen-
dent" approach, which views resorting to the state constitution as necessary only
when federal law does not protect the right asserted. FRIESEN, supra note 1,
1.06. See infra note 31 for a discussion of the approach of Alaska courts.
Under each of these approaches, federal constitutional precedent only consists
of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The Alaska Supreme Court
has adopted the generally followed approach that "[w]here a federal question is
involved, the courts of Alaska are not bound by the decisions of federal courts
other than the United States Supreme Court." Harrison v. State, 791 P.2d 359,363
n.7 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
24. Professor Friesen notes that "[s]tability" in the applicable law, "disentan-
gled from the changing trends of the federal courts," is one reason why state
supreme courts resort to their own constitutions. FRIESEN, supra note 1, 1.03,
at 1-15. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court on double jeopardy
are an example of changing federal precedent. "While the [Double Jeopardy]
Clause itself [is simple], the decisional law in the area is a veritable Sargasso Sea
which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." Albernaz
v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
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federal court. If the federal court finds that the state court
incorrectly interpreted the minimum protections of the Federal
Constitution, it will reverse the conviction.
Reversals by federal courts are often entered many years after
the original trial.' In self-incrimination cases, where the remedy
on reversal most frequently requires a new trial in which the
defendant's confession is excluded, retrials can be particularly
difficult. The prosecution may have relied heavily on an excluded
confession as the centerpiece of its case. As a result, on retrial,
other potential witnesses may have died; evidence may not have
been preserved; or any number of other problems may have arisen
that threaten the prosecution's ability to present a prima facie case
years after the offense was committed. On the other hand, if a
state court decides in favor of the defense solely on federal
constitutional grounds, the prosecution could then appeal26 and
even seek relief from the United States Supreme Court if appeals
in state courts prove unavailing.2
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Endell, 860 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 981 (1990). The original Alaska prosecution began in 1981, as State v. Smith,
No. 3AN-S81-6231 CR (Alaska Super. Ct. 3d Jud. Dist.), but the decision was not
reversed by the federal court until 1988, seven years later.
26. Under the Alaska appellate rules and statutes, if an indictment or charge
is dismissed, the prosecution has traditionally had the right to appeal to test the
sufficiency of the indictment. ALASKA R. APP. P. 202(c); ALASKA STAT.
§ 22.07.020(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1994). Alaska Statutes section 22.07.020 was
recently amended to increase the prosecution's right to appeal to all cases that do
not violate double jeopardy. ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.020(d)(2) (Supp. 1994).
However, in State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994), the court of
appeals held that the amendment to the statute does not give the prosecution
authority to appeal if the judgment is not final.
In cases in which evidence is suppressed and the remedy falls short of
dismissal of the charges, prosecutors can file for a discretionary interlocutory
appeal. In Alaska, this action is called a petition for review and is often granted
on the ground that the state would not have a remedy if the case proceeded to
trial without the issue having been decided. See ALASKA R. APP. P. 401-03; Kott
v. State, 678 P.2d 386, 388-91 (Alaska 1984); Stump v. State, 547 P.2d 305, 305-06
(Alaska 1976); State v. Garcia, 752 P.2d 478, 479 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
27. The Court has broadly construed its power to review federal question
appeals by the prosecution in criminal cases. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), the Court held that it will presume that a state court's decision is based on
federal law unless it includes a "plain statement" clearly indicating that the
decision is based on independent state grounds. Id. at 1041. The Court's interest
in reviewing appeals by the prosecution in state court decisions involving federal
constitutional rights has been criticized by Justice Stevens. See id. at 1069-70
[Vol. 12:1
SELF-INCRIMINATION PROTECTION
State courts can avoid the uncertainty and delay caused by
federal scrutiny of their decisions by developing a body of protec-
tion under their respective state constitutions over and above the
federal constitutional minimum. By developing and relying on state
constitutional protection, state courts can significantly stem the
possibility of post-conviction appeals in federal courts, by either the
defendant or the prosecution.28 If a state court ensures that the
minimum federal constitutional requirements are satisfied, any
further protection that it undertakes to provide based on the state
constitution will be insulated from federal review.
IV. ALASKA CASE LAW ON THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In Baker v. City of Fairbanks,29 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the Alaska Constitution should be liberally construed to
provide greater rights when appropriate:
[W]e are free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional
constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitu-
tion if we find such fundamental rights and privileges to be
within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional
language and to be necessary for the kind of civilized life and
ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional
heritage.0
Thus, Alaska courts have a broad mandate to interpret the
language of the Alaska Constitution to provide rights distinct from
and broader than those that exist under the Federal Constitu-
tion.3
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's docket has become "swollen with
requests by States to reverse judgments that their courts have rendered in favor
of their citizens"); see also FRIESEN, supra note 1, 1.01, at 1-6 to -9.
28. See FRIESEN, supra note 1, 1.03, at 1-13.
29. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
30. Id. at 401-02.
31. This language was quoted in part in State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 529
(Alaska 1993), where the Alaska Supreme Court used it to justify a broad inquiry
into sources of authority other than United States Supreme Court precedent or the
intent of the framers of the Alaska Constitution. Id However, Alaska courts
have held that they will not entertain arguments for interpretations of the Alaska
Constitution that differ from the Federal Constitution unless the issue is properly
raised. For example, the Alaska Court of Appeals has noted that "it is incumbent
upon a litigant to point this court to something in the text, context, or history of
the Alaska Constitution which justifies [a] divergent interpretation." Mitchell v.
State, 818 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). But see
Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969), where the Alaska Supreme Court
1995]
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In view of Alaska's general tradition of granting greater
protection under the state constitution than the federal minimum,
Alaska courts might be expected to interpret the Alaska Constitu-
tion's self-incrimination provisions more broadly than the Federal
Constitution's provisions are interpreted. However, Alaska courts
have rarely expanded federal constitutional protections in deciding
self-incrimination cases. An examination of the relatively few cases
where the courts have adopted a divergent interpretation of the
Alaska Constitution quickly reveals a theme.
A. Cases in Which Alaska Courts Have Granted Broader Self-
Incrimination Protection Under the Alaska Constitution
The most significant recent case in which Alaska courts have
found broader self-incrimination protection under the Alaska
Constitution than under the Federal Constitution is State v. Gonza-
lez.3' In Gonzalez, the Alaska Supreme Court, affirming a
decision by the court of appeals, held that a statute allowing the
state to compel testimony on a grant of "use and derivative use"
immunity violated Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.33
The court held that the defendant must be granted the more
comprehensive "transactional" immunity when the state compels
him or her to testify in face of the hazard of self-incrimination.34
declared that looking "only to the United States Supreme Court for constitutional
guidance would be an abdication by this court of its constitutional responsibilities."
Id. at 342.
Although the statement in Roberts would seem to indicate that Alaska courts
are among those who give "primacy" to state constitutional law, the statement in
Mitchell indicates that some Alaska courts now look to state constitutional law to
"supplement" federal interpretations, finding independent state constitutional
grounds only when there are persuasive reasons to depart or diverge from federal
constitutional law.
32. 853 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993), affg 825 P.2d 920 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
33. Id. at 530. Use and derivative use immunity "prohibits only the use of the
compelled testimony and all evidence derived therefrom in future criminal
proceedings against the witness." Feldman & Ollanik, supra note 11, at 230.
Stated another way, use and derivative use immunity "permits prosecution of the
witness for crimes referred to in the compelled testimony if the prosecution is
based entirely on independently obtained evidence." Id. at 230-31.
34. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d at 530-32. In contrast, the United States Supreme
Court has held that "immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination .... Transactional immunity...
affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
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The Alaska Supreme Court and Court of Appeals reached the
same result by using very different rationales. The court of appeals
focused to a large extent on the "Alaska Constitution's unique
concern with the rights to liberty and privacy, and the Alaska
Supreme Court's vigilant enforcement of these rights."35 Howev-
er, the Alaska Supreme Court based its decision almost entirely on
the practical problems that would occur in implementing the use
and derivative use immunity statute in criminal trials:
We now reach the question at the center of this case: does a
grant of use and derivative use immunity remove the hazard of
incrimination? We do not doubt that, in theory, strict applica-
tion of use and derivative use immunity would remove the
hazard of incrimination .... In a perfect world, one could
theoretically trace every piece of evidence to its source and
accurately police the derivative use of compelled testimony. In
our imperfect world, however, the question arises whether the
judicial process can develop safeguards to prevent derivative use
of compelled testimony that satisfy [A]rticle I, section 9.
Because we doubt that the workaday measures can, in practice,
protect adequately against use and derivative use, we ultimately
hold that [Alaska Statutes section] 12.50.101 impermissibly
dilutes the protection of [A]rticle I, section 9.36
The supreme court justified striking down the statute largely
because there would inevitably be a case where the compelled
testimony was used against the accused, even if done inadvertently
and in good faith. The court's analysis had a practical emphasis.
The court was particularly concerned with ensuring the integrity of
the judicial fact-finding process. Only when it saw no practical way
to protect an accused's privilege against self-incrimination did the
court conclude that the statute was unconstitutional under Article
I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.
Transactional immunity "absolutely precludes prosecution of a witness for
crimes referred to in the compelled testimony." Feldman & Ollanik, supra note
11, at 230. It is interesting to note that the law review article by Feldman and
Ollanik was published in 1986, seven years before Gonzalez was decided. The
rejection of use and derivative use immunity would be a long time in coming, but
Feldman and Ollanik proved correct in their prediction. Like the court in
Gonzalez, the authors pointed out the practical shortcomings of use and derivative
use immunity and stated that, while in theory it provides the same protection as
transactional immunity, "[in the real-life world of criminal prosecution," it does
not. Id. at 250.
35. State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920, 933 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
36. State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 530 (Alaska 1993) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
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Another significant case finding expanded self-incrimination
rights under the Alaska Constitution was Stephan v. State,37 in
which the supreme court held that, whenever possible, authorities
must tape-record advice of Miranda rights and statements obtaied
from a suspect in a place of detention. Although the court based
its decision on the Due Process Clause of the Alaska Constitution,
it was, of course, greatly concerned with self-incrimination. The
court held that due process required the recording rule because in
the absence of an "accurate record," an accused's right against self-
incrimination and right to counsel during custodial interrogation
could be infringed."
However, the court noted that its ruling was not only a
"measure to protect the accused."39 "[T]he public's interest in
honest and effective law enforcement, and the individual interests
of police officers wrongfully accused of improper tactics," factored
into its decision as well.40 The court noted that recording devices
were almost universally available to the police and that current
technology ensured their reliability.4
The court's main rationale for its holding, as well as its
imposition of the exclusionary rule as the remedy, was that the
"integrity of [Alaska's] judicial system" would be threatened if the
propriety of an interrogation were to be judged solely from the
potentially conflicting testimony of the interested parties. 42 The
court saw no reason why the courts should have to resolve "swear-
ing matches" between defendants and police officers when these
unseemly contests could be avoided with "the mere flip of a
37. 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
38. Id. at 1161. Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly
considered the recording requirement, the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), in which the Court held that the
authorities' failure to preserve a defendant's breath samples was not constitutional-
ly material and thus not a violation of due process. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1160 &
n.13. To ensure that it would not be reversed, the Stephan court emphatically
stated that it based the recording requirement solely on Alaska constitutional law.
id.
39. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1161.
40. Id
41. Id. at 1161-62. The recording requirement is excused in situations of
unavoidable power or equipment failures or where the accused refuses to answer
questions because the conversation is being recorded. Id. at 1162; see also George
v. State, 836 P.2d 960, 962 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (excusing recording requirement
because police in small village did not have a functioning tape recorder).
42. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1164.
[Vol. 12:1
SELF-INCRIMINATION PROTECTION
switch."'  In Stephan, as in Gonzalez, the supreme court based its
expansion of self-incrimination protection under the Alaska
Constitution on pragmatic oncerns about the integrity and efficacy
of the judicial fact-finding process. The court again decided that to
secure an accused's self-incrimination rights, a blanket rule was
appropriate where considerable doubt existed that the fact-finding
process itself would provide adequate safeguards.'
In Scott v. State,' the Alaska Supreme Court departed from
the federal rule established by Williams v. Florida.' In Williams,
the United States Supreme Court upheld a requirement that a
defendant give the prosecution pre-trial notice of any defenses that
it intended to use as well as the names and addresses of defense
witnesses.47 The Supreme Court held that such a broad discovery
order was merely a matter of "timing," because the defense was
only being forced to reveal what it would eventually have disclosed
anyway.48
Although the Scott court recognized that the Federal Constitu-
tion and decisions from other jurisdictions allowed trial courts to
43. Id. at 1161, 1164.
44. Most other states have declined to follow Stephan. See, e.g., State v.
Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 745 (Haw. 1994) (citing cases). However, the Minnesota
Supreme Court recently adopted a recording requirement similar to the one in
Stephan. Scales v. State, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).
Like the Stephan court, the Scales court saw no practical reason not to impose
the requirement. The facts of Scales were a good example of why a recording rule
should be in effect. The testimony of police officers and the defendant on what
occurred during a custodial interrogation was diametrically opposed. 518 N.W.2d
at 590. The sole record of defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was a written
waiver form. The defendant's statement was in the form of a signed question and
answer transcript prepared over three hours after the interrogation began. Id.
The defendant claimed that he had not been permitted to read the question and
answer transcription before he signed it and that he was not actually given
Miranda warnings until the interrogation was well underway. The defendant
further denied that he actually made a number of the statements contained in the
transcript. Id. Although the court affirmed Scales' conviction due to the
overwhelming evidence of his guilt, it was obviously troubled by the lack of
reliable evidence to refute the defendant's claims. Id. at 590-91. The court
decided to impose a recording requirement in the exercise of its supervisory power
over the administration of justice. Id. at 592.
45. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
46. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
47. Id. at 83.
48. Id. at 85.
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require extensive pre-trial discovery orders,49 it held that the order
was overly broad under Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion."o The first part of the discovery order in Scott required the
disclosure of the names and addresses of all prospective defense
witnesses. The court held that this condition violated Article I,
section 9 by potentially furnishing links in the chain of evidence
that the prosecution might not have otherwise been able to
discover on its own.5 The next part of the order, which required
the defense to turn over any written or recorded statements of
witnesses, violated Article I, section 9 for the same reason. 2
The Alaska Supreme Court refused to apply the Williams
"timing" rationale because the extensive pre-trial discovery ordered
by the trial court affected more than mere "timing."'53 The court
observed that under Williams, a defendant may have to reveal
sources of potentially incriminating information without which the
prosecution would be unable to make a prima facie case.54 The
court offered, as an example, a witness known only to the defense
who would testify that the defendant did kill the alleged victim, but
did so in self-defense. The court reasoned that the defense
should not be compelled to reveal the identity of this witness at
least until after the prosecution had presented its case.56  If
required to do so earlier, the prosecution would learn of the sole
eyewitness, who would have been used, if at all, to present a weak
self-defense claim as a last resort.5 7 Thus, in Scott, the Alaska
Supreme Court again emphasized the importance of preserving an
accused's privilege against self-incrimination by ensuring that the
prosecution's evidence was not obtained in violation thereof.
58
49. Scott, 519 P.2d at 779-83.
50. Id. at 785. However, it did uphold a requirement that the defense give
notice of its intent to rely on an alibi defense. Id.
51. Id. at 786.
52. Id.
53. See the discussion of Scott in Feldman & Ollanik, supra note 11, at 258-59.
54. Scott, 519 P.2d at 783.
55. Id. at 786 (citing Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 466 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal.
1970)).
56. Id.
57. IM.
58. Changes to the current discovery rule, ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16, have been
proposed by the Criminal Rules Committee of the Alaska Supreme Court. The
proposed changes would require defendants to provide the prosecution with more
discovery with regard to expert witnesses, notices of defense, and physical
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In Nelson v. State,59 the Alaska Court of Appeals departed
from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fletcher v.
Weir" and held that the admission of a defendant's post-arrest
silence before Miranda warnings are given violates the right against
self-incrimination under Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion.6 However, the court abandoned its constitutional analysis
in Silvernail v. State,6' where it analyzed an accused's pre-arrest
silence under Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 rather than under
Article I, section 9. The court held that while pre-arrest silence
generally has low probative value, its prejudicial effect is great.
Following authority from other jurisdictions, notably People v.
Conyers,' the court elected to avoid the constitutional question
because the introduction of this prejudicial evidence plainly
violated Alaska Rule of Evidence 403.65 Given courts' general
tendency to avoid constitutional issues whenever possible, it is more
probable that the court will follow the Silvernail approach in the
future and decide similar cases under Rule 403 rather than reach
the self-incrimination issue raised in Nelson.
TWo final cases in which Alaska courts have granted greater
protection against self-incrimination under the Alaska Constitution
are Skan v. State66 and Pinkerton v. State.67 In both cases, the
Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals respec-
tively held that, contrary to the federal rule,6 a target of grand
jury proceedings must be given self-incrimination warnings if called
as a witness. The explicit holding to this effect in Pinkerton was
evidence. A majority of the committee rejected the Department of Law's proposal
to implement a "reciprocal discovery" system in Alaska. The proposed rules and
position papers regarding reciprocal discovery are included in a memorandum
from Christine E. Johnson, Court Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System, to
members of the Alaska Bar Association (on file with author).
59. 691 P.2d 1056 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
60. 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
61. Nelson, 691 P.2d at 1059.
62. 777 P.2d 1169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
63. Id at 1175-77.
64. 420 N.E.2d 933 (N.Y. 1981).
65. Silvernail, 777 P.2d at 1177.
66. 511 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1973).
67. 784 P.2d 671 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
68. See, e.g, United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977) ("target
warnings" not required by the Fifth Amendment).
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supported by dicta in Skan citing with approval the American Bar
Association Standards on this point.69
Pinkerton and Skan also dealt with court proceedings and the
fact-finding process. The courts rested their decisions to a great
extent on the Alaska Constitution's right of privacy," as well as
on fairness to potential grand jury witnesses.71 Unless witnesses
are advised that they might be a target of prosecution, they do not
have enough information to effectively exercise their right against
self-incrimination.7 2
Despite the aforementioned decisions, Alaska courts are
generally reluctant to grant broader protection for self-incrimina-
tion rights under the Alaska Constitution than that afforded by the
Federal Constitution. As a result, in most cases in which a criminal
defendant claims that his or her privilege against self-incrimination
under the Alaska Constitution was violated, Alaska courts will
follow the contours of the federal constitutional standard.
B. Cases in Which Alaska Courts Have Not Granted Greater
Self-Incrimination Protection Under the Alaska Constitution
1. Right to Counsel Cases.73  In Thiel v. State4 and Kochu-
tin v. State,7' the Alaska Court of Appeals addressed one of the
most interesting and complex areas of self-incrimination: when the
police may question a person who, personally or through friends or
family, has retained or contacted an attorney.
In Thiel, the police suspected the defendant of acting as a
lookout in a robbery. They contacted him at his father's house and
asked him to come to the police station for an interview.76 Thiel
69. Pinkerton, 784 P.2d at 676; Skan, 511 P.2d at 1297 n.6 (citing A.B.A.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTIcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCrION, §§ 3-3.6(2) (2d ed. 1980)).
70. See supra note 8.
71. Pinkerton, 784 P.2d at 676.
72. Id.
73. As noted above, there is both a Sixth Amendment right to counsel once
adversary proceedings have begun and a Fifth Amendment right to counsel during
custodial interrogations. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
74. 762 P.2d 478 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
75. 813 P.2d 298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991), vacated, 875 P.2d 778 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1994). These two decisions will be referred to respectively as Kochutin I and
Kochutin I.
76. Thiel, 762 P.2d at 480.
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declined. Furthermore, Thiel's father told the police that he had
retained an attorney for his son and gave the police the attorney's
name.77 The police then enlisted an erstwhile friend of Thiel's to
act as an informant.78 They obtained a warrant79 and tape-
recorded conversations between the two men in which Thiel
admitted his involvement in the robbery."
The court of appeals first noted that federal courts had
uniformly refused to consider police-initiated informant contacts to
be a violation of the Sixth Amendment.8' As for the Alaska
Constitution, the court held that the right to counsel under Article
I, section 11 only attached during adversarial proceedings.' The
court conceded that previous Alaska decisions extended the right
to counsel in Article I, section 11 to some non-courtroom situa-
tions, but it emphasized that those cases "all involve[d] some form
of adversarial proceeding."' ' The court therefore declined to
apply Alaska's right to counsel to Thiel's confession to the police
informant because the confession did not meet the characteristics
of an adversarial proceeding. 4
In Kochutin I,' the defendant was in jail on an unrelated
charge when the body of a young boy was found in his home
village on St. Paul island in the Bering sea. As a suspect, Kochutin
was put in administrative segregation and then was moved to a pre-
trial correctional facility in Anchorage. 6  At that point, he
contacted the attorney who represented him on the original charge.
The attorney called the Alaska State Troopers, who wanted to
question Kochutin. After consulting with his attorney, Kochutin
decided not to talk to the troopers. His attorney wrote a letter to
77. Id
78. Id.
79. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) (Alaska constitutional law
requires a warrant for "consensual" monitoring).
80. Thiel, 762 P.2d at 480.
81. Id. at 481.
82. Id. at 482.
83. Id. at 482-83. The Alaska Supreme Court has held that indigent litigants
in a variety of criminal and non-criminal cases have a right to court-appointed
counsel under the Due Process Clause of the Alaska Constitution. See, e.g.,
Matter of K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991); Thiel, 762 P.2d at 482.
84. Thiel, 762 P.2d at 483.
85. Kochutin v. State, 813 P.2d 298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
86. Id. at 300.
87. Id.
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the district attorney and to the troopers asserting Kochutin's right
to remain silent and right to counsel.'
One year later, the trooper assigned to the case asked the
district attorney whether he could question Kochutin, believing that
he would be able to get a statement from Kochutin by approaching
him without informing his attorney. The district attorney assented,
and the trooper questioned Kochutin, eventually obtaining his
confession to the murder. 9
The Alaska Court of Appeals held that the trooper's actions
violated the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court
in Edwards v. Arizona,' that once an accused has invoked his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation,
the authorities may not initiate further interrogation until counsel
has been made available." Thus, in Kochutin 1, the court of
88. Id.
89. Id. at 301-02.
90. 451 U.S. 477 (1980).
91. Id. at 484-85. The Edwards rule has gone through several refinements and
distinctions since its adoption in 1981. In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986),
the Court held that the failure of the police to inform a suspect under custodial
interrogation that an attorney hired by his sister was trying to see him did not
violate either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. In Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), the Court held that once a defendant has invoked
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, here by requesting the appointment of
counsel at an arraignment, the police could not initiate further interrogation.
In Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), the Court held that the Edwards
rule applied to a suspect who, after invoking his Fifth Amendment right to counsel
during interrogation on one burglary charge, was reinterrogated by different
officers concerning an unrelated burglary. The Court excluded the confession
made during the reinterrogation even though Roberson waived his Miranda rights
during that interrogation, and even though the officers were unaware that he had
asserted his rights during the first interrogation. Id. at 686-88. In Roberson, the
Court made it-clear that it meant Edwards to be a "bright-line" rule. Id. at 681.
In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), the Court further clarified the
"bright-line" nature of the rule. The defendant was interrogated by FBI agents
and asserted his right to an attorney. Id. at 148-49. The questioning ceased, and
Minnick was given a chance to consult with a lawyer in jail on two or three
occasions. Id. at 149. Then, a Mississippi deputy sheriff interrogated Minnick
after his jailers told him that he had to go down to the interview. Id. Minnick
waived his Miranda rights and made inculpatory statements. Id. The Court held
that the statements must be suppressed under Edwards because the Fifth
Amendment secures not only the right to consult with an attorney, but to have the
counsel actually present during custodial interrogation. Id. at 154.
Finally, in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment does not provide the blanket protection of the Fifth Amend-
[Vol. 12:1
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appeals declined to address the breadth of protection that the
Alaska Constitution would provide because it relied entirely on the
Edwards rule. The court noted that the passage of the one-year
period of time and the fact that Kochutin was, after the initial
interrogation, placed in the general prison population on unrelated
charges distinguished Kochutin I from Edwards. Nonetheless, it
held that the bright-line Edwards rule was controlling.'
As an alternative basis for its decision, the court of appeals
held that Kochutin's waiver of his Miranda rights was not volun-
tary.93 The persuasive factors were Kochutin's expressed desire
to deal with the authorities through counsel, the troopers' and the
district attorney's deliberate bypassing of Kochutin's attorney, and
Kochutin's continuous custody throughout the relevant period. 4
The Kochutin II decision arose upon the discovery, shortly
after the publication of Kochutin I, that Kochutin had not been in
ment as interpreted in Miranda and Edwards. In McNeil, the defendant was
appointed counsel at arraignment on one charge but was later interrogated on
another charge. Id. at 173-74. The Court upheld the admission of McNeil's
statement. It first held that the appointment of counsel at arraignment did not
invoke McNeil's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 178-79. The appointment did
invoke his Sixth Amendment rights, but those rights are "offense specific." IdJ at
175. The police could not have talked to McNeil about the charges for which he
was arraigned, but they could talk to him about other charges without violating his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 178.
92. Kochutin v. State, 813 P.2d 298, 304-05 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
93. Id. at 305; see infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
94. Kochutin I, 813 P.2d at 306. The court was "particularly troubled" that the
district attorney directed the police to interrogate Kochutin even though he knew
that Kochutin was represented by counsel. Id. The trial court held that the
district attorney violated the disciplinary rule in effect at the time, ALASKA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-104(a)(1), repealed by ALASKA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1993). The court of appeals declined to
consider the violation as independent grounds for suppressing the confession, but
it did find that it was a significant factor in the voluntariness question. Kochutin
I, 813 P.2d at 306; see also Depp v. State, 686 P.2d 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
The issue of prosecutorial contact with represented defendants in apparent
violation of disciplinary rules is a matter of some controversy. See United States
v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's dismissal of charges
based on prosecutors' contact with defendant). Prosecutors often argue that such
contacts are justified in the absence of formal proceedings because the suspect is
not yet a "party" or because such contact is "authorized by law." ld. However,
the current Alaska rule prohibits contact with a represented person "whether or
not [the person is] a party to a formal proceeding." ALASKA RuLES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.2 cmt. (1993). The new rules do not specifically address
whether communications by prosecutors would be "authorized by law."
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continuous custody. The court of appeals remanded the case to the
trial court, which found that there had been a break of several
months in the one-year period between Kochutin's original
assertion of his rights and the second interrogation.' The court
of appeals considered the break in custody to be determinative of
both the Edwards rule and the voluntariness of waiver issue. The
court vacated its opinion in Kochutin I and affirmed Kochutin's
murder conviction.96 The Kochutin II court was faced with the
opportunity to provide broader protection under the Alaska
Constitution than the Edwards rule, and it refused.
It is noteworthy that in at least one other jurisdiction, the
result in Kochutin II may have been different. The New York
Court of Appeals has held, as a matter of state constitutional law,
that when an accused obtains representation by counsel on a
particular incident, the police may not question a suspect in custody
with regard to that incident without the attorney present.97 This
right attaches even if the suspect is given Miranda warnings and
agrees to waive his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel. 98
Thus, Alaska courts have not yet recognized a greater Fifth
Amendment right to counsel in situations covered by the Edwards
rule. Moreover, based on Thiel, it appears unlikely that any rights
beyond those set out in the United States Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment case law will be recognized. 99
2. Miranda Custody Cases. Another controversial topic in
self-incrimination case law is the question of when a suspect is
considered to be "in custody," and, thus, entitled to be advised of
Miranda rights. Alaska courts have generally considered this issue
95. Kochutin v. State, 875 P.2d 778, 779 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
96. Id. at 779-80. In Kochutin I, the court did not address the issue of
Kochutin's right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution. In dissent, Chief Judge
Bryner, noting Thiel, would have held that Article I, section 11 conferred greater
rights than the Sixth Amendment. Kochutin 1, 813 P.2d at 310-11 (Bryner, C.J.,
dissenting). In its short opinion in Kochutin I, the court of appeals did not
address state constitutional arguments at all. Kochutin , 875 P.2d at 778-80.
97. People v. Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1981); People v. Rogers, 397
N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1979).
98. See People v. Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d 360 (N.Y. 1980).
99. See, e.g., Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (reaffirming
that Article I, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution confers no greater rights to
counsel than the Sixth Amendment); see also Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700 (Alaska
1979); Abdullah v. State, 816 P.2d 1386 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
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strictly under the Fifth Amendment, as illustrated in the Kochutin
cases noted above.
In the leading case of Hunter v. State,"° the Alaska Supreme
Court essentially adopted what would later become the United
States Supreme Court's approach to the issue.' The test is
whether a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would feel
free to leave, or ask the police to leave, and break off question-
ing."0 Under these criteria, a person need not actually be placed
under arrest to be in Miranda custody. Rather, the standard is
applied independently of any formal arrest procedure."° In the
same vein, it is not determinative of the suspect's entitlement to
Miranda warnings that he or she could be considered "seized"
through an investigative stop under Fourth Amendment analy-
sis.' °4
100. 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979).
101. Hunter was cited in a leading treatise: W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.6(c), at 493 (1984). Professor LaFave believes that an objective
test from the point of view of a reasonable person being interviewed is the
appropriate one. Id.
Hunter also established that three groups of facts are relevant to the
determination of Miranda custody: (1) facts intrinsic to the investigation; (2) facts
pertaining to events before the interrogation; and (3) facts relevant to what
happened after the interrogation was over. Hunter, 590 P.2d at 895. Although
Professor LaFave generally agrees with the Hunter approach to resolving the
custody issue, he does not believe that what happens after an interrogation is
relevant. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra, at 585-86. The United States Supreme Court
expressly adopted an objective test in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra, at 105 (1991 Supp.) (discussing Berkemer).
102. Hunter, 590 P.2d at 895.
103. Id.
104. See Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (following
Berkemer rationale that even though standards used to determine custody under
Fourth and Fifth Amendments are very similar, not every instance where a person
is considered "seized" under the Fourth Amendment, or under Article I, Section
14 of the Alaska Constitution, will impose the same "coercive pressure" as
Miranda custody). Compare United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)
(Fourth Amendment seizure) and Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357 (Alaska 1983)
(Article I, section 14 seizure) with Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)
(Fifth Amendment custody) and Blake, 763 P.2d at 515 (Article I, section 9
custody). Once again, in another context, Alaska courts are hesitant to grant any
greater protection of self-incrimination rights than that guaranteed under the
Federal Constitution. Blake, 763 P.2d at 515; see also McCollum v. State, 808 P.2d
268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (stop of defendant in store parking lot did not trigger
Miranda custody).
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Generally speaking, one situation where Alaska courts have
been willing to find Miranda custody is when the police question a
suspect during the execution of a search warrant and feel that it is
necessary to take intrusive measures to preserve evidence and
ensure officer safety. 5 However, courts have rarely found
Miranda custody in vehicle stop cases,1'6 even relatively intrusive
ones.
107
Another frequent situation in which Miranda custody issues
arise are station house interrogations where the police tell a suspect
that he or she is "free to leave" at any time and will not be
arrested." s Alaska courts will typically follow federal precedent
and conclude that Miranda custody does not exist, even though the
police may have more than enough probable cause for arrest and
many suspects would surely conclude that arrest is imminent."°
Recently, however, the court of appeals has begun to admit that a
sufficiently intrusive interrogation by the police can give rise to
Miranda custody."0
105. See Higgins v. State, 887 P.2d 966 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); Moss v. State,
823 P.2d 671 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
106. McCollum v. State, 808 P.2d 268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Blake, 763 P.2d
at 511.
107. Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
108. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 621 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1980) (suspect told he would
not be pursued if he decided to leave); Tagala, 812 P.2d at 609 ("[The police]
repeatedly assured Tagala he was free to leave and not under arrest."); Lowry v.
State, 707 P.2d 280, 282 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) ("[O]ne of the officers expressly
advised Lowry that he was not under arrest."). But see Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d
1173,1178-79 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) ("Even though Hampel was told that he was
not formally under arrest, a reasonable person in his situation would not have felt
free to leave."); see also infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing
Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989)).
109. See, e.g., Tagala, 812 P.2d at 606-09. Tagala was subjected to a vehicle stop
and voluntarily accompanied the police back to the station, where he was
questioned about a homicide that occurred in the parking lot of a bar the night
before. Id. at 606. Tagala and another suspect had left the bar together, and it
was generally known that there was "bad blood" between Tagala and the victim.
Id. Shortly after questioning began, Tagala admitted shooting the victim. The
court held that Tagala was not in Miranda custody because the police "repeatedly
assured [him] that he was free to leave and that he was not under arrest." Id. at
609. For representative United States Supreme Court cases applying similar
principles, see Stansbury v. California, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (1994); Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
110. See Edwards v. State, 842 P.2d 1281 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Long v. State,
837 P.2d 737 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
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These "free to leave" cases are without question an active area
of litigation. The Alaska courts' efforts to toe the Fifth Amend-
ment line in this area of the law have resulted in an increased
resort to the federal courts. For example, the United States
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to review a decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upholding the Alaska Court of Appeals' determination that the
defendant's station house interrogation was noncustodial and
voluntary."'
3. Miranda Interrogation. In addition to being in custody, a
suspect must be "interrogated" to trigger the Miranda advice
requirement. Alaska courts have consistently applied the United
States Supreme Court's formula for determining what circumstances
are considered interrogation. This test asks whether the words or
actions used by the authorities are "'reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response."""
The more troubling cases in this area involve re-interroga-
tions. 13  When a suspect remains in continuous custody, re-
interrogation is not permitted unless the suspect initiates further
conversation with the police.14  Alaska courts have once again
followed United States Supreme Court precedent on the question
of what conduct constitutes an initiation of conversation by the
suspect."-
4. Miranda Waiver. Alaska courts have neither expanded
the content required in Miranda warnings nor increased the
standard for a valid waiver of Miranda rights beyond the minimum
requirements of the United States Supreme Court's decisions. In
Webb v. State,"6 the Alaska Supreme Court noted that it "has
never held that Miranda type advisements are required under the
111. Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989), affd sub nom
Thompson v. Keohane, 34 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (mem.), cert. granted, 115
S.Ct. 933 (1995).
112. Beagle v. State, 813 P.2d 699,705 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)).
113. For a discussion of this issue in connection with Kochutin, see supra notes
85-96 and accompanying text.
114. Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979).
115. See May v. State, 856 P.2d 793 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
116. 756 P.2d 293 (Alaska 1988), rev'g 720 P.2d 953 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
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Alaska Constitution independent[ly] of the [F]ederal [C]ons-
titution."' 7
In Webb, a motorist was stopped after he picked up a package
from an airfreight office."1 The police knew the package con-
tained marijuana. The police officer asked the defendant for his
driver's license and advised him of his Miranda rights."9 Howev-
er, the officer did not return the license. Instead, he told the
defendant that he could retrieve the license by making a statement
at the police station." The Alaska Supreme Court held that
Webb's Miranda waiver was involuntary because the officer
impermissibly conditioned the exercise of his Fifth Amendment
rights on his driver's license.' Webb was based solely on federal
constitutional law."
There is an important Miranda waiver issue that Alaska courts
have yet to decide. In Oregon v. Elstad,"-z the United States
Supreme Court held that a subsequent confession, obtained after
Miranda warnings were given, was not necessarily the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" of a prior confession obtained in violation of
Miranda."4 The Elstad Court rejected the "cat out of the bag"
theory of United States v. Bayer,"5 in which the Court held that
once an accused has let the "cat of the bag" by confessing, any
subsequent statement is per se tainted by the first confession
despite an otherwise valid Miranda waiver.126
117. Id at 296 n.7. Several other states have adopted Miranda warnings as a
requirement of state constitutional law. See FRIESEN, supra note 1, 12.02, at 12-
8 n.12.
118. Webb, 756 P.2d at 294.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 295.
121. Id at 297; see also Kochutin v. State, 875 P.2d 778 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994)
(defendant's waiver of Miranda rights valid).
122. Webb, 756 P.2d at 297 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37
(1966)).
123. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
124. Id. at 304, 318.
125. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
126. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303-04. The Bayer Court summarized the "cat out of
the bag" theory as follows:
After an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no
matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psycholog-
ical and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get
the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a
later confession always may be looked upon as the fruit of the first.
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540.
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A number of states have rejected the narrow approach of
Elstad by providing additional protection under state constitutional
law.'27 It remains to be seen how the Alaska Supreme Court will
rule on the Elstad issue. However, applying the Elstad rule could
require the type of "taint" hearings that the Alaska Supreme Court
viewed with disfavor in State v. Gonzalez."z That possibility, as
well as the court's preference for bright-line rules that it exhibited
in Stephan,29 provides some room for speculation that the court
would reject the Elstad approach as a matter of Alaska constitu-
tional law. If the court does reject Elstad, it will likely include the
importance of accurate judicial fact-finding among its grounds for
decision.30
5. Voluntariness. In addition to requiring waivers of
Miranda warnings to be voluntary, Alaska decisions also predicate
the admissibility of confessions on their voluntariness under the
totality of the circumstances. The essential inquiry is whether a
suspect's "will was overborne" by coercive police conduct. 3'
127. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288 (Mass. 1992); People
v. Bethea, 493 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1986). But see People v. Lewis, 786 P.2d 892, 899
(Cal. 1990) (finding no broader protection under state law because newly enacted
state constitutional amendment eliminated judicially created state remedies for
violation of self-incrimination rights that are not federally compelled); State v.
Allenby, 847 P.2d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (declining to review Elstad under state
law because prior case law specifically held that state constitutional protection
against self-incrimination was not broader than the Fifth Amendment). See
generally FRIESEN, supra note 1, 12.02[3][a], at 12-9 to -10 (noting that Elstad
"has not found universal acceptance by state courts").
A number of commentators have criticized Elstad. See, e.g., Marte J. Bassi,
Note, Restricting the Miranda Presumption and Pruning the Poisonous Tree:
Oregon v. Elstad, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 331 (1986); Karen S. DesRoches,
Comment, "Whither Went Miranda?"- Oregon v. Elstad, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1229 (1985); Bettie E. Goldman, Note, Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly Stepping
Backwards to Pre-Miranda Days?, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 245 (1985); Jeffrey 3.
Miller, Oregon v. Elstad: The Supreme Court Goes Back to the Future With a New
Voluntariness Test for Unwarned Confessions, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 913 (1985).
128. 853 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993), affg 825 P.2d 920 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); see
supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
129. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985); see supra notes 37-44 and
accompanying text.
130. But see Kochutin v. State, 813 P.2d 298, 307 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991)
(questioning whether the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is firmly rooted in
Fifth Amendment Miranda case law).
131. See Edwards v. State, 842 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
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Involuntary confessions are traditionally excluded on due process
grounds rather than through self-incrimination provisions. 132
Challenging the voluntariness of a confession is a frequent basis for
appeal, but very few defendants have been successful in their
claims.'33 Alaska courts have generally followed the United
States Supreme Court in recognizing a lack of voluntariness where
a defendant's confession is marred by threats, promises or influ-
ence, whether express or implied.TM
6. Miscellaneous Issues. There are a few other self-incrimina-
tion cases that deserve to be mentioned. In State v. J.R.N.,'35 the
Alaska Supreme Court reversed a decision in which the Alaska
Court of Appeals excluded a confession obtained from a juvenile
before his parents were notified of his arrest. At the time of the
case, Delinquency Rule 7(b) provided that the authorities must
"immediately" notify a juvenile's parents upon a juvenile's
•arrest. 136  J.R.N.'s parents were not notified until seven hours
after his arrest and, significantly, not until after the he had made a
full videotaped confession to killing the alleged victim and stealing
his car.'37 The Alaska Supreme Court held that a juvenile was
capable of waiving his or her right to parental notification and
remanded the case to determine whether the waiver was knowing
and voluntary.
31
132. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 101, § 6.2(b), at 441-44.
133. See, e.g., State v. Ridgley, 732 P.2d 550, 555-56 (Alaska 1987), rev'g 705
P.2d 924 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Soovalik v. State, 612 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1980);
Edwards v. State, 842 P.2d 1281 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); S.R.D. v. State, 820 P.2d
1088 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127 (Alaska Ct. App.
1989), affd sub nom Thompson v. Keohane, 34 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (mem.),
cert. granted, 115 S.Ct. 933 (1995) (citing cases), for examples of cases in which the
courts have ruled against a defendant's claims of involuntariness. But see S.B. v.
State, 614 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1980) (remanding to determine whether confession
was in fact induced by promise of leniency); Smith v. State, 787 P.2d 1038 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1990) (finding that confession was induced by promise of leniency).
134. S.B., 614 P.2d at 789.
135. 861 P.2d 578 (Alaska 1993), rev'g 809 P.2d 416 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
The published appeal after remand is J.R.N. v. State, 884 P.2d 175 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1994).
136. ALASKA DEL. R. 7(b). This rule has since been amended to provide that
notice to the juvenile authorities shall be "immediately, if possible, and in no event
more than 12 hours" after the arrest. Id
137. JR.N., 861 P.2d at 579.
138. The Alaska Court of Appeals had concluded that parental notification was
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Alaska courts have also followed Fifth Amendment case law
in concluding that the self-incrimination privilege cannot be
asserted unless there is a real or substantial hazard of incrimina-
tion.3 Finally, Alaska courts follow federal case law in review-
ing Fifth Amendment violations under the harmless error beyond
a reasonable doubt standard.' 4
V. WHAT TO EXPECT IN FUTURE ALASKA CASES INVOLVING
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
It is evident from the preceding sections that Alaska courts
have not granted broader protection under the Alaska Constitu-
tion's self-incrimination provisions than the federal standard unless
the ability of the judicial fact-finding process to protect a criminal
defendant's rights against self-incrimination is in question. Given
Alaska courts' usual reliance on federal constitutional grounds in
self-incrimination cases, their decisions are not as insulated from
federal review as if they were based on state constitutional law.
Therefore, federal courts have more opportunity to review self-
incrimination cases than in, for example, search and seizure cases,
where Alaska courts are more prone to find independent state
constitutional grounds for decision.
Alaska courts have an excellent record of not being reversed
on federal constitutional grounds. With the exception of Davis v.
Alaska, 4' the United States Supreme Court has never reversed
an Alaska state criminal conviction. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also infrequently reversed Alaska
courts. Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed an Alaska
conviction in Smith v. Endell.142 Not surprisingly, this case was
reversed on Fifth Amendment grounds.
The defendant in Smith was interviewed by Alaska State
Troopers, who caught him with drugs at the Anchorage Interna-
as much the parent's right as the child's. J.R.N., 809 P.2d at 419. However, the
Alaska Supreme Court reversed, ruling that parents did not have standing to
object to the admission of the confession. State v. J.R.N., 861 P.2d 578, 580
(Alaska 1993).
139. See M.R.S. v. State, 867 P.2d 836, 839-41 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
140. See Lewis v. State, 779 P.2d 806, 808 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
141. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
142. 860 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, (1990).
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tional Airport.43 The troopers also suspected him of committing
a double homicide. Smith was willing to discuss the drug problem,
but when the discussion touched upon the homicide, he asked the
troopers if they were looking at him as a suspect.' 44 If so, he
informed them that he was considering asking for a lawyer. Instead
of ascertaining whether Smith was invoking his right to counsel, the
troopers continued the interrogation. 45
The Ninth Circuit held that Smith made an ambiguous request
for counsel, giving the troopers an obligation to safeguard Smith's
Fifth Amendment rights by resolving the matter before continuing
the interrogation."4 Accordingly, the court reversed Smith's
conviction.' 47
The validity of Smith is questionable now, in light of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United
States.'" In Davis, the Court held that a suspect "must articulate
his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney."'49  The lesson of
Smith and Davis is that by declining to establish clear state
constitutional rules in self-incrimination cases over and above the
federal minimum, Alaska convictions will be subject to an increas-
ing resort to the ever-changing boundaries of federal constitutional
law.150
VI. CONCLUSION
Alaska courts have elaborated a rich state constitutional
jurisprudence over the past twenty-five years. Unlike many other
state courts, Alaska courts have not omitted the rights of criminal
defendants from their innovative interpretation of the Alaska
Constitution. However, in self-incrimination cases, Alaska courts
have been reluctant to afford greater state constitutional rights than
143. Smith, 860 F.2d at 1529.
144. Ik
145. Id. at 1529-30.
146. Id. at 1532.
147. Id. at 1534.
148. 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994).
149. Id. at 2355.
150. In connection with this point, it will be interesting to note the progress of
the litigation before the United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Keohane,
34 F.3d 1073 (9th cir. 1994) (mem.), cert. granted, 115 S.Ct. 933 (1995); see supra
note 111 and accompanying text.
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the federal norm. Examining the case law, the only exceptions to
this trend are cases in which the courts have practical concerns
about the ability of the judicial fact-finding process to adequately
protect an accused's rights. As a result of this reluctance to find
independent state constitutional grounds, criminal defendants will
undoubtedly increase their appeals to federal courts, where the
vagaries of federal constitutional self-incrimination law will decide
their fate. The Alaska Supreme Court should seize an opportunity
to flesh out the text of the self-incrimination provisions of the
Alaska Constitution, both to ensure continuity and consistency in
Alaska constitutional law, as well as to establish a "ceiling" of
rights that accurately reflects "the kind of civilized life and ordered
liberty which is at the core of [Alaska's] constitutional heri-
tage.' 1
51
151. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970).
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